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Abstract
In information systems security, the objectives of risk analysis process are to help to identify new threats  
and vulnerabilities, to estimate their business impact and to provide a dynamic set of tools to control  
the security level of the information system. The identification of risk factors as well as the estimation  
of their business impact require tools for assessment of risk with multi-value scales according to different 
stakeholders’ point of view. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to model risk analysis decision making 
problem using semantic network to develop the decision network and the Analytical Network Process 
(ANP) that allows solving complex problems taking into consideration quantitative and qualitative data.  
As a decision support technique ANP also measures the dependency among risk factors related  
to the elicitation of individual judgement. An empirical study involving the Forestry Company is used  
to illustrate the relevance of ANP.
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Introduction
The pervasive uses of and dependencies  
on information technologies have increased 
security risks which can induce losses in companies 
revenue and reputation. Despite the external sources  
of security attacks, internal abuse and malicious 
activity may generate an unexpected damage. 
Companies protect their networks by means  
of ad hoc security solutions such as access control 
measures, procedures to prevent and respond  
to security incidents and risk assessment. The review 
of the common risk analysis frameworks reveals 
four mainly steps. They are (a) the classification  
of information assets according to their 
sensitivity, (b) the identification of the threats 
and vulnerabilities, (c) the likelihood occurrences 
and impact estimation of these threats and (d) 
the implementation of controls and corrective 
countermeasures taking into consideration their 
cost.
In this paper we explore the potential 
relevance of the Analytical Network Process 
(ANP) use in information systems security 
(ISS) context to support the development  
of individual understanding of security risks 
leading to richer elaboration of problem spaces.  
The identification of a number of risk factors 
requires a classification according to their severity 
and impact on the information system activity. 
However, this classification should pay attention 
to the influence of contextual variables such  
as the exploration of multiple perspectives  
of contextual understanding of security risk factors. 
The involvement of organizational stakeholders 
to assess security risks with multi-value scales 
would result in a better understanding of the role 
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and application of security functions in situated 
practices and an achievement of contextually 
relevant risk analysis (Bednar and Katos, 2010, 
Sadok et al., 2014). 
In fact, a number of researchers have identified 
qualitative and quantitative approaches of IS 
risk analysis. The reliability of qualitative 
methods is based on the subjective assessments 
of experts during the evaluation process (Klimeš 
and Bartoš, 2015, Bartoš and Walek, 2013, 
Walek et al., 2013). The quantitative methods 
are mainly based on mathematical models  
and can be divided into: i) deterministic methods, 
ii) probabilistic methods, iii) methods using 
analogies, and iv) multi-criteria evaluation methods  
(EIC/ISO). As to the multi-criteria evaluation 
methods, Delphi method is often used to evaluate 
risk factors (Briš, 2009, Procházková, 2011b). 
However and in order to overcome the drawbacks 
of available risk analysis approaches, Klimeš 
and Bartoš (2015) suggested fuzzy approach  
to decision making process based on six sub  
processes and including several IF-THEN-rule 
knowledge bases. 
Although ANP as a decision support technique has 
the potential to measure the dependency among 
security risk factors it is not commonly used  
in the Czech Republic (Procházková, 2011a). 
Few studies have been applied ANP to assess  
the importance of individual elements  
of the consumer's behaviour of the framing effect 
(Rydval, 2011, Rydval and Bartoška, 2013, Rydval 
and Brožová, 2011). As to the Delphi method  
the ANP uses experts’ judgement. It is noticeable 
that more experts are involved in the evaluation 
process more relevant the final assessment is.
Consequently, our approach is firstly based  
on the identification of crucial and significant risk 
factors leading to the threats and vulnerabilities 
of information systems. Secondly, the risk factors 
and relationships between them are described using 
semantic network in order to develop the decision 
network. The ANP is then used for the priority 
evaluation of these factors (Brožová et al., 2015). 
This leads to a better definition and implementation 
of effective security countermeasures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
In section 2, a short review of ANP and semantic 
network concepts found in literature are provided. 
In section 3 scenarios of security risk factors 
are described. The section 4 presents the results  
of an empirical study conducted in the forestry 
company. Finally, concluding remarks are presented 
in section 5.
Materials and methods
Semantic network 
Semantic network illustrates different points  
of view as well as the relationships between different 
relevant elements within a decision context.  
In effect, semantic networks were originally 
used to express meanings of various expressions 
in natural language. According to Sowa (2000) 
semantic networks are used namely because of their 
ability to easily provide usable system to represent 
information and to mainly focus on the organization 
of a large number of information sources. They 
also support the description of complex processes 
and offer a tool to represent the understanding  
of a problem space.  
Semantic (associative) network is defined  
as a directed graph consisting of nodes and edges 
(Sowa, 2000). Nodes represent items of described 
problem and edges connecting these nodes represent 
relationships between these items. Fundamental 
types of these relations are as follows:
• IS-AN-INSTANCE-OF (IIO) relationship is 
used to state that a particular object (instance 
of a particular class) belongs to the specified 
class.
• IS-A-KIND-OF (IKO) relationship is used 
to state that a class is a subclass of another 
class.
• IS-A-PART-OF (IPO) relationship is used 
to state that a certain class of objects is 
composed of some parts.
The semantic network of the decision problem 
can be used as a starting point for the creation  
of the ANP decision network. The basic advantage  
of the semantic network is that it contains 
information similar to information stored  
in the human memory, and it is machine-
understandable. This means that it can be machine-
processed. Therefore, it is possible to analyse facts 
and information included in the semantic network 
and to acquire new knowledge about represented 
facts (Steyvers and Tenenbaum, 2005, Xia and Bu, 
2012).
ANP method
The ANP is a multiple criteria decision method 
based on the network representation of a decision 
problem which considers the dependence across 
elements and levels of a decision problem 
(Saaty, 2001, 2003). The crucial step of the ANP  
is the pairwise comparison of all pairs of elements 
related to the same element from higher level  
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or different cluster from decision network. The steps 
of the ANP method for this study are as follows:
1. The first step – the semantic network 
describing the elements of the ISS decision 
problem and their relationships are 
constructed.
2. The second step - the network is created 
based on the semantic network to describe 
inner dependence within a set (clusters)  
of decision elements, and outer dependence 
among different sets (clusters) of the decision 
elements. 
3. The third step - the pairwise comparisons  
of the elements within and across  
the clusters are made. The consistency  
of these comparisons is also checked.
4. The fourth step - if the comparison is not 
consistent, the decision maker will see 
how to change and adjust the comparison 
(Hlavatý, 2014).
5. The fifth step - the normalized 
supermatrix with the preferences derived  
from the previous pairwise comparisons is 
calculated.
6. The sixth step - the limiting supermatrix is 
computed using program SuperDecision  
and global preferences of decision elements 
are obtained (Saaty, 2001).
Evaluation of the pairwise comparisons
The importance of each factor is made using 
Saaty pairwise comparison of all factors related  
to the factor or cluster on the higher level  
(Saaty, 2008). The pairwise comparison  
is used to estimate the importance of ISS factors  
in pairs from different points of view.  A single 
number from the fundamental 1–9 scale are 
standardly used for expert estimation. The Table 1 
shows the explanation of each value in this scale  
in the ISS context comparison of the first  
and second factor from the pair.
This evaluation could be made for example  
by a security expert. His judgement has to be 
consistent, if not we use simple role showing how 
to improve judgement consistency. The range  
of feasible values of each preference in Saaty’s 
matrix can be computed from assuming  
the inconsistency index must not reach  
over the threshold and ideal values of the selected 
intensity relatively to the other values on the basis 
of requirement that the consistency index is equal 
to 0 (Hlavatý, 2014). If the values in Saaty’s matrix 
are not consistent, ideal values are calculated  
and the expert got a feedback and an advice  
on how to adjust the comparison. After this process 
we obtain the consistent Saaty matrices and the ANP 
model is calculated by SuperDecision software.
Calculation of the limit matrix
The calculation of the synthetized weights  
(for example preferences of ISS factors) is then 
provided using the software SuperDecisions 
(SuperDecision). The synthetized weights are 
calculated in the limit matrix. The input to the limit 
matrix calculation is the normalized supermatrix, 
which is a matrix of local weights, i.e. preferences 
derived from the previous pairwise comparisons. 
The standard steps of the limit matrix calculation 
are (Saaty, 2001).
1. Raise the matrix to larger powers, and either,
2. The powers will converge to the limit matrix, 
or
3. The powers will converge to a cycle  
of matrices and the limit matrix is the average 
of these.
This algorithm performs remarkably well except  
in two circumstances (Adams, 2011):
• Hierarchies: In the case of hierarchies  
the large powers of normalized supermatrix 
Source: own processing according to Saaty (2008)
Table 1: Fundamental scale of pairwise comparison of ISS factors.
Intensity  
of importance Definition Explanation
1 Equal Importance Two factors equally important for ISS
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly favour the first ISS factor 
over the second one
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favour the first ISS factor 
over the second one
7 Very strong or demonstrated importance The first ISS factor is favoured very strongly over the second one; its importance demonstrated in practice
9 Extreme importance
The highest possible degree of preference of the first ISS 
factor over the second one
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eventually go to zero and then the limit 
matrix contains all zeros (in other words  
no nodes get any scores of preferences).
• Sinks in general: Even in networks  
with feedback, if there are sinks  
in the network (nodes without connections 
emanating from them) then the large powers 
of the normalized supermatrix will still 
tend toward zero (at least many columns  
of the limit matrix tend to zero).
Identity at sinks method is the standard approach  
to avoid this problem with calculation the limit 
matrix for hierarchies as well as networks with sinks 
adding self-loop to the sinks (Adams, 2011) and this 
does give correctly synthesized values for the sinks, 
but all other nodes get zeros from this calculation. 
This synthesis is used to determine the weights 
only of ISS factors which lies in the end nodes  
of the semantic network. These factors are 
considered primary in ensuring the ISS. Calculus 
Type method is another approach (similar 
philosophy as the differential calculus). This 
type of calculation again calculates large powers  
of the supermatrix, but these powers are normalized 
(Adams, 2011). This normalized supermatrix will 
not still tend toward zero and returns correctly 
synthesized values for all nodes in the network. 
This way we get the weights of all the elements  
of the semantic network.
Scenarios of security risk factors 
In the particular context of ISS it is necessary 
to construct different scenarios of security 
risk factors reflecting different points of view.  
The comparison and integration of security 
risk factors within a semantic network provide  
an overview of the relative importance  
and impact of a particular security risk factor. This 
leads to identify the most important security risk 
factors and to assess their impact on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of an information system. 
Consequently, appropriate mitigation decisions  
to cope with and reduce security risks could 
efficiently be made. 
In this section we describe three diagrams as 
produced by three stakeholders (end user, network 
administrator, security expert) respectively 
following a security ‘Data breach’. These diagrams 
contain the most relevant security risk factors and 
their relations. The view of the security expert 
related to possible security risk factors explaining 
the ‘Data breach’ is captured in Figure 1. 
Source: Sadok et al., 2014
Figure 1: Security expert’ diagram.
The view of the network administrator  
about possible security risk factors explaining  
the ‘Data breach’ is captured in Figure 2.
Source: Sadok et al., 2014
Figure 2: Network administrator’ diagram.
The end user’s view about possible security risk 
factors explaining the ‘Data breach’ is captured  
in Figure 3.
Source: Sadok et al., 2014
Figure 3: End user’ diagram.
Semantic network as a tool for system analysis  
of the decision process is used for the description 
of the IS risk factors and its relations. It shows  
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the structure of possible ISS factors, factors 
hierarchy, relations and factors influenced  
by different user groups. It can show individual 
elements influencing issues of ‘Data breach’.  
It provides us with information about relationships 
in the network between individual factors  
of the ISS and how they can influence the threatened 
data. However, it does not give us the quantitative 
information about the importance of these factors 
and how much they influence the ‘Data breach’.  
The semantic network is used as a decision network 
for the ANP method and the SuperDecision program 
(SuperDecision).
The Figure 4 shows that the issue of ‘Data breach’ 
consists of three main instances. They are: ‘Poor 
understanding of security policies’, ‘Failure  
to track or adapt to technological changes’,  
and ‘Poor fit of technology to business needs’.
Each of these three major instances of the ‘Data 
breach’ incorporates various elements expressing 
different possibilities of the instances development. 
These elements could be divided into a different 
number of sub elements describing the component 
parts of the element responsible for a particular 
instance of the ‘Data breach’.
Some elements, respectively sub-elements can 
play multiple roles within the semantic network 
because of the differences between the three points 
of view. The role of the element and its affiliation  
to the class of elements or sub-elements is displayed 
in the Figure 4 using evaluated connection between 
the elements (IIO, IKO or IPO). For example,  
the element ‘Poor e-mail security controls’ plays 
two kinds of roles. First it is a kind of instance 
of item ‘Poor understanding of security policies’ 
(oriented connection IKO) and second it is a part 
(sub-element) of the element ‘RAT installed’ 
(connection IPO).
The pairwise comparison of items of the created 
decision network is then made by different groups 
in the organisation including managers, security 
experts and end users. This judgement is initially 
filled in special form in MS Excel (Table 2) which 
helps users to make consistent decisions during  
the comparison process.
Source: own processing
Figure 4: Semantic Network of ‘Data breach’. 
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After the user files this table the consistency index 
is computed. If the comparisons are not consistent 
the automatic calculation shows ideal value  
of each individual preference relatively  
to the others two values. These ideal values can 
support the adjustment of the initial evaluation  
in case it is not consistent (Table 3).
Results and discussion
The forestry company
Although the dependency of agricultural  
and forestry companies on IT use is not very 
high it is not anymore conceivable for these 
companies to miss the benefits of such use. In fact, 
the sustainability and competitiveness of their 
activities are intimately based on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of their information systems 
management. However, it is necessary to secure 
information systems assets to ensure business 
continuity and economic profits. 
In this section, we describe the application 
of ANP for risk management in a particular 
agricultural enterprise. Vojenské lesy a statky ČR, 
a state enterprise, is an organization with a history  
that goes back to more than eighty years. 
Vojenské lesy a statky ČR manage an area of more 
than 126,000 hectares of forest land and more  
than 6,000 hectares of agricultural land and water 
area. It is one of the largest organizations of its type 
in the Czech Republic. Its main activities include 
forest management, trade in timber, hunting, 
fishing, agricultural activity, nature protection 
among others. The objective of the enterprise 
is, in line with the assignment from its founder,  
the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic,  
to be at the top in the field of forest-based industry 
and agricultural production. It aims to maintain 
sustainable forest and agricultural ecosystems using 
modern technology and knowledge with respect  
to the environment and maintaining natural 
landscape features. There is a separate ICT 
department within Vojenské lesy a statky  
which is in charge of supporting information 
systems activities and users. In enterprises of such 
size (more than 2,000 employees), an important 
number of supporting information systems are 
used, and the organization information assets are 
very valuable. As a result, the failure or any actions 
that compromises the availability, confidentiality 
or integrity of these assets would cause significant 
negative impact on the enterprise’s operations  
and performance.
Expert evaluation of the ANP model according  
to the proposed structure was obtained during 
discussions with end users, IS network 
administrators, security experts and also one 
manager from the same company. Their judgments 
were checked for their consistency and slightly 
modified if necessary according to the ideal 
values guideline. End users evaluated the ISS 
factors from the group ‘Poor fit of technology  
to business needs’, security expert compared factors  
from the group ‘Poor understanding of security 
policies’ and network administrator from the group 
‘Failure to track or adapt to technological changes’. 
Manager and all users compared also these three 
groups. The Table 4 and Figure 5 show weights 
Source: own processing
Table 2: MS Excel form for pairwise comparisons.
A - most important Equally B - most important
A 9 7 5 3 1 3 5 7 9 B
Poor password practices x Poor reporting procedures
Poor password practices       x    RAT installed  
Poor reporting procedures        x  RAT installed  
Source: own processing
Table 3: Ideal values for pairwise comparisons.
Weights
Poor reporting procedures 1.000 9.000 0.333 0.324 -2.206 9.000 0.333 Lambda 3.2056 Consistency index
RAT installed  0.111 1.000 0.143 0.056 0.111 -2.206 0.143 Determinant -6E-05 0.10
RAT installed  3.000 7.000 1.000 0.62 3.000 7.000 -2.206
Ideal values 1  
1.167 0.643
0.019
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of three groups of ISS factors. Factors included  
in ‘Poor understanding of security policies’ are 
seen very important for all except for management  
(all individual weights are greater than 0.3). 
Generally managers feel ‘Poor fit of technology 
to business needs’ as higher important (more 
than 0.6). Network administrator gives higher 
importance to ISS factors ‘Failure to track or adapt 
to technological changes’ (more than 0.5). 
Global importance or synthesized preferences  
of the partial ISS factors are calculated in the limit 
matrices. Limit matrix received by Calculus type 
method (Table 5, Figure 6) shows most important 
ISS factors from all (preferences higher than 0.07). 
These factors are mainly from the first ISS factors 
group (‘Poor understanding of security policies’) 
according to the network administrator, end users 
and security expert. Management also gives  
the high priority to the factors from the third 
group of the ISS factors (‘Poor fit of technology  
to business needs’).
When the Identity of sink method is used, the highest 
preferences of primary ISS factors are calculated 
(Table 5, Figure 7). Eight ISS factors can be seen 
as important ISS factors from different points  
of view (preferences higher than 0.1). The first six 
factors ‘Poor risk management’, ‘Poor prevention 
mechanisms’, ‘Poor detection mechanisms’, 
‘Poor monitoring’, ‘Privilege escalation’,  
and ‘Poor definition of permissions’ are evaluated 
as very important from practically all stakeholders.  
The last two factors ‘Lack of password management’,  
and ‘Malware protection failure’ are considered 
of high importance from the management point  
of view.
These results are coherent with and support previous 
works on ISS with a socio-technical perspective. 
In effect, rather than a dominant emphasis  
on technologies, for instance, it is essential  
to fund processes that fully bridge the gap between 
design and implementation of secure and usable 
systems through open discussion and dialogue 
between relevant stakeholders leading to better 
contextual appreciation of risks. It is also necessary  
to understand how organizational and environmental 
factors as well as compliance behavior may affect 
the efficient use of security controls and policies.
Source: own processing
Figure 5: Weights of groups of ISS factors.
Source: own processing
Table 4. Weights of groups of ISS factors.
Groups of ISS factors Administrator End User Security Expert Management
1 Poor understanding of security policies 0.303510 0.694061 0.753111 0.104725
2 Failure to track or adapt to technological  changes 0.518996 0.131510 0.062917 0.258292
3 Poor fit of technology to business needs 0.177494 0.174429 0.183972 0.636982
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
1 Poor understanding of
security policies
2 Failure to track or adapt to
technological  changes
3 Poor fit of technology to
business needs
Administrator
EndUser
Security Expert
Management
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Source: own processing
Table 5: Weights of ISS factors.
Administrator End User Security Expert Management
Identity 
sink
Calculus 
type
Identity 
sink
Calculus 
type
Identity 
sink
Calculus 
type
Identity 
sink
Calculus 
type
1 Poor understanding of security policies  0.0984  0.2251  0.2439  0.0317
1.1 Inadequate asset management  0.0066  0.0150  0.0163  0.0021
1.1.1 Unreliable  software 0.0020 0.0007 0.0046 0.0015 0.0050 0.0016 0.0007 0.0002
1.1.2 Poor risk management 0.1201 0.0389 0.2250 0.0730 0.2430 0.0787 0.1582 0.0499
1.2 Poor e-mail security controls  0.0733  0.1320  0.1422  0.1065
1.2.1 Poor prevention mechanisms 0.1108 0.0359 0.1994 0.0647 0.2151 0.0697 0.1652 0.0522
1.2.2 Poor detection mechanisms 0.0606 0.0196 0.1321 0.0428 0.1431 0.0464 0.0362 0.0112
1.3 Poor incident response procedures  0.0459  0.1051  0.1138  0.0148
1.3.1 Poor monitoring 0.0472 0.0153 0.1080 0.0350 0.1172 0.0379 0.0163 0.0049
1.3.2 Privilege escalation 0.0472 0.0153 0.1080 0.0350 0.1172 0.0379 0.0163 0.0049
2 Failure to track or adapt to technological  changes  0.1683  0.0427  0.0204  0.0782
2.1 BYOD paradigm  0.0337  0.0085  0.0041  0.0156
2.1.1 Large number of users 'levels 0.0053 0.0017 0.0013 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0026 0.0008
2.1.2 Spyware on device 0.0236 0.0076 0.0060 0.0019 0.0029 0.0009 0.0117 0.0036
2.1.3 Unverified software 0.0749 0.0243 0.0190 0.0062 0.0091 0.0029 0.0373 0.0113
2.2 Inadequate access control  0.1010  0.0256  0.0122  0.0469
2.2.1 Firewall shortfalls 0.0150 0.0049 0.0038 0.0012 0.0018 0.0006 0.0074 0.0023
2.2.2 No mandatory  encryption policy 0.0595 0.0193 0.0151 0.0049 0.0072 0.0023 0.0296 0.0090
2.2.3 Poor definition of permissions 0.2369 0.0768 0.0600 0.0195 0.0287 0.0093 0.1179 0.0357
2.3 Lack of user awareness  0.0337  0.0085  0.0041  0.0156
2.3.1 Inadequate user training 0.0519 0.0168 0.0132 0.0043 0.0063 0.0020 0.0258 0.0078
2.3.2 Lack of knowledge of technology 0.0519 0.0168 0.0132 0.0043 0.0063 0.0020 0.0258 0.0078
3 Poor fit of technology to business needs  0.0575  0.0566  0.0596  0.1929
3.1 Poor password practices  0.0148  0.0145  0.0153  0.0495
3.1.1 Lack of password management 0.0410 0.0133 0.0403 0.0131 0.0425 0.0138 0.1472 0.0446
3.1.2 Disclosure, modification of data 0.0122 0.0040 0.0120 0.0039 0.0127 0.0041 0.0439 0.0133
3.2 RAT installed  0.0397  0.0391  0.0411  0.1331
3.2.1 Malware protection failure 0.0373 0.0121 0.0366 0.0119 0.0386 0.0125 0.1338 0.0405
3.3 Poor reporting procedures  0.0031  0.0030  0.0032  0.0102
3.3.1 Lack of staff 0.0008 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0008 0.0003 0.0146 0.0008
3.3.2 Pressure for productivity 0.0018 0.0006 0.0017 0.0006 0.0018 0.0006 0.0093 0.0019
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Source: own processing
Figure 6: Weights of ISS factors by Calculus type method.
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Source: own processing
Figure 7: Weights of ISS factors by Identity at Sinks method.
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Conclusion 
This paper aimed to shed light on the challenge 
of introducing security in a sensible and useful 
manner by addressing the contextual perspectives. 
The identification of security risk factors as well 
as the estimation of their business impact require 
tools for assessment of risk with multi-value scales 
according to different stakeholders’ point of view. 
We argue in this paper that ANP provides a relevant 
approach to assess security risk factors taking 
into consideration quantitative and qualitative 
data. A case study is discussed to illustrate such 
relevance. The understanding of the importance 
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of security risk factors support the definition and 
implementation of efficient and effective security 
controls and policies.
Recognizing the complexity nature of security 
risk management, a number of implications  
for practitioners and researchers can be identified 
and should be deeply addressed. For example,  
to assist and facilitate assessment of risk with multi-
value scales according to different stakeholders’ 
point of view, a potential interdisciplinary 
research area emerges to develop techniques  
and modelling support for analysis aiming  
at inquiries into uncertain and complex problems 
spaces.
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